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Abstract  
 
As the centenary of the Russian revolution of 1917 approaches, it is worth reviewing the past 100 
Ǉeaƌs͛ disĐussioŶ amongst economists on the possibility – or otherwise – of economic planning 
under socialism.  The socialist calculation debate is of fundamental importance, not merely as a 
specialist application of economic ideas, but as an investigation of the foundations of all economic 
activity.  Every economic action whatsoever is premised upon calculation, every choice depends 
upon an assessment of the costs and benefits of each alternative between which the agent is to 
choose.  The view taken of that choice and its attendant calculation, in market and non-market 
contexts, is constitutive of the schools of thought – Marxian, neoclassical and Austrian alike – which 
have contributed to the debate.  An understanding of the calculation debate is therefore required in 
order to understand how these paradigms stand in relation to each other.  This paper addresses one 
particular detail of that debate – the claim by Austrian economists that socialism is impossible 
because the absence of private property in the means of production precludes economic calculation.  
The paper suggests that several control rather than private property is required for economic 
calculation, and that the latter is consistent with public ownership of the means of production.  The 
Austrian argument on this point, therefore, is without force.   
  
1 Introduction 
This is the first in a projected series of papers examining the socialist calculation debate in the run-
up to the centenary of the Russian Revolution of 1917.  As this milestone approaches, it is worth 
reviewing the past century͛s discussion amongst economists on the possibility – or otherwise – of 
economic planning under socialism.  The socialist calculation debate is of fundamental importance, 
not merely as a specialist application of economic ideas, but as an investigation of the foundations of 
all economic activity.  Every economic action whatsoever is premised upon calculation, every choice 
depends upon an assessment of the costs and benefits of each alternative between which the agent 
is to choose.  The view taken of that choice and its attendant calculation, in market and non-market 
contexts, is constitutive of the schools of thought – Marxian, neoclassical and Austrian alike – which 
have contributed to the debate.  An understanding of the calculation debate is therefore required in 
order to understand how these paradigms stand in relation to each other.   
This paper addresses one particular detail of that debate – the claim by Austrian economists that 
socialism is impossible because the absence of private property in the means of production 
precludes economic calculation.  The paper suggests that the Austrian writers make a fundamental 
error when they make economic calculation depend upon private ownership.  Instead of centring 
their argument on private property they should have considered (a) several rather than private 
property, and (b) control rather than ownership or property.  Once one makes this replacement, the 
claim that socialism is impossible evaporates.  This is not to say that socialism necessarily therefore 
is possible, merely that this particular case for its impossibility fails.   
The next section looks at what the socialist calculation debate was about, and addresses the 
ŵeaŶiŶg of ͚iŵpossiďilitǇ͛.  “eĐtioŶ ϯ looks at the AustƌiaŶ Đase foƌ ĐlaiŵiŶg that ƌatioŶal eĐoŶoŵiĐ 
calculation depends upon the existence of private property, finding that key Austrian contributors to 
the debate fail to provide an argument to support this claim.  Section 4 argues that a wider version 
notion of property, namely several property, is a more appropriate notion, and that it is control, not 
property which is key.  Several control is not inconsistent with socialism.  Section 5 addresses and 
rejects a potential objection to the kind of market socialism that has been describe, namely that its 
socialist content has been dilute to the point of disappearing.  The final section sets out the findings 
of the paper.   
2 The Socialist Calculation Debate 
The socialist calculation debate refers to a controversy amongst academic economists, mainly in the 
inter-war period, as to the possibility of socialist planning.  It may be seen as an attempt by scholars 
to address both the coming to power of the communist party in Russia, and the apparently 
inexorable rise of socialist ideas – with planning at their heart – expressed by the European social 
democratic parties, particularly in Germany.  For economists of the Austrian school this was not 
merely an opportunity, but a fundamental duty: defence of the laissez-faire system constituted the 
very raison d'être of economics.   The opening shot was the publication in 1920 of "Die 
Wirtschaftsrechnung im sozialistischen Gemeinwesen" (Economic calculation in the socialist 
community) by Ludwig von Mises, in Maǆ Weďeƌ͛s German-language journal, Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaften.  In this paper (Mises, 1935) Mises took up and, I may say, comprehensively 
defeated, the calculation-in-kind ideas of the non-Marxian socialist, and leading logical positivist, 
Otto Neurath, as well as those of writers such as Bukharin, who thought that war communism was 
the first step on a road to a better society.   
Mises͛s papeƌ ǁas ƌe-published by Friedrich Hayek in another highlight of the debate, his 1935 
collection, Collectivist Economic Planning. Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism (Hayek, 
1935), which also included essays by Hayek, N.G. Pierson, Georg Halm, and Enrico Barone.  Much ink 
has been spilt in the interpretive battle between those who believe that Hayek was following in 
Mises͛s footsteps aŶd deǀelopiŶg his ideas, aŶd those ǁho felt oŶ the ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ that he ǁas 
abandoning Mises and making undue concessions to the socialists.  The most significant contribution 
to the debate in the 1930s was contained in two articles and then a book chapter by Oskar Lange 
(Lange, 1936; 1937; 1938) setting out what has come to be known as the market-socialism model of 
planning.  The debate and its results were notably summarised in ͞“oĐialist EĐoŶoŵiĐs͟ ďǇ Aďƌaŵ 
Bergson (1948). The socialists were widely regarded as having seen off their Austrian antagonists –– 
and feǁ thought that the ͚iŵpossiďilitǇ thesis͛ retained much credibility.  By 1948, according to 
BeƌgsoŶ, ͞it seeŵs geŶeƌallǇ agƌeed that the aƌguŵeŶt oŶ these ƋuestioŶs adǀaŶĐed ďǇ Mises 
hiŵself, at least aĐĐoƌdiŶg to oŶe iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ, is ǁithout ŵuĐh foƌĐe͟ ;BeƌgsoŶ, ϭϵϲϲ: ϭϵϯ-194).  
Laǀoie agƌees: ͞theƌe is a ƌeŵaƌkaďlǇ ǁide ĐoŶseŶsus that he [sĐ Mises] ǁas ǁƌoŶg͟ ;Laǀoie, ϭϵϴϭ: 
43).  Since then, several waves of Austrian writers have reverted to the issue to try to argue that the 
Austrian contribution to the debate was in fact the more profound, and that the impossibility thesis 
had been proven.  The demise of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist countries at 
the beginning of the 1990s gave impetus to further claims that the Austrians had been right all 
along.  Particularly worthy of mention amongst later Austrian contributions are those of Lavoie 
(1981), just mentioned, and Boettke (2001), who we shall draw on in the sequel.   
For the purposes of this paper, we will ignore aspects of the debate not relevant to the key point I 
wish to focus on, the question as to whether private property or several control is a prerequisite for 
rational economic calculation.  These aspects include the discussion of planning in kind and the 
application of the labour theory of value to post-capitalist societies.  Ignoring them is not innocuous: 
it embodies a claim, or at least a concession, namely that arguments for rational economic 
calculation can be constructed on neither of these bases.   
A preliminary issue which has to be dealt with before the discussion proper concerns what it is that 
the Austrians have done, just assuming for the moment that their argument is valid.  Is it to 
demonstrate an impossibility argument – socialism is, quite simply, impossible, in the same sense 
that it is impossible for a formal system to be both complete and consistent?  Or have they rather 
drawn attention to a practical difficulty of such magnitude that it is wholly unlikely that a workable 
socialism could ever exist.  The former is an absolute, the latter a relative, argument.  Something 
either is or is not impossible, but difficulty is a matter of degree, albeit extreme difficulty might be 
tantamount to impossibility.  This is not a trivial by-issue.  If soĐialisŵ is iŵpossiďle theŶ it͛s poiŶtless 
to discuss how it might be implemented.  If it is very difficult then a sober and extensive analysis of 
those difficulties is in order.   
Barrow & Tipler (1986: 100, 188) take the view that Hayek has discovered an impossibility principle.  
They cite Hayek to argue that it is iŵpossiďle to ͞deliďeƌatelǇ arrang[e] all the activities that go on in 
a Đoŵpleǆ soĐietǇ͟ ďeĐause to do so ͞ǁould Ŷo loŶgeƌ ŵake use of many minds, but would be 
altogetheƌ depeŶdeŶt oŶ oŶe ŵiŶd͟ ;HaǇek, 1973: 49).  That ͚oŶe ŵiŶd͛ ǁould faĐe the 
insurmountable problem that ͞a suffiĐieŶtlǇ aĐĐuƌate ŵodel͟ of the soĐietǇ ͞would be too complex 
to be coded in any mind or computer in the societǇ͟ ;Baƌƌoǁ & Tipleƌ, ϭϵϴϲ: ϭϴϴ-ϭϴϵͿ.  IŶdeed, ͞oŶe 
of HaǇek͛s aƌguŵeŶts ǁas aĐtuallǇ a foƌŵal ŵatheŵatiĐal pƌoof that a fiŶite state ŵaĐhiŶe Đould Ŷot 
pƌediĐt its futuƌe eǀolutioŶ͟ ďeĐause of ͞the iŵpossiďilitǇ of Đoŵplete self-ƌefeƌeŶĐe͟ (Barrow & 
Tipler, 1986: 189).  Barrow & Tipler (1986: 215, n276) suggest that Hayek in this way anticipated 
Turing since, although The Sensory Order (Hayek, 1952), which is said to contain this argument, was 
published in the 1950s, it was actually drafted in the 1920s.  No further explanation is given as to 
how anything in The Sensory Order constitutes the anticipation of Turing that Barrow and Tipler 
claim, and inspection of the volume itself did not reveal anything bearing on this matter to this 
writer.   
Mises seems cleaƌ oŶ the ŵatteƌ, asseƌtiŶg iŶ Ŷuŵeƌous plaĐes aŶd ǁithout Đaǀeat that ͞rational 
economic activity is impossible in a socialist commonwealth͟ ;Mises, 1935: 130).   Hayek himself 
took the second position, that socialist planning was not in principle impossible, but so very difficult 
that it is wholly improbable that humans could ever devise such a system.  Discussing the 
mathematical solution to economic calculation under socialism of Taylor, Roper and Dickinson, 
HaǇek saǇs that ͞it must be admitted that this is not an impossibility in the sense that it is logically 
contradictory͟, ƌatheƌ ͞It is only necessary to attempt to visualize what the application of this 
method would imply in practice in order to rule it out as humanly impracticable and impossible͟ 
(Hayek, 1935: 207-208).  Moreover this second, less extreme version, is the meaning of 
͚iŵpossiďilitǇ͛ ǁhiĐh he asĐƌiďes to Mises.   Mises, he saǇs,  
emphasized in particular … that the wastes due to the impossibility of rational calculation in 
a completely socialized system might be serious enough to make it impossible to maintain 
alive the present populations of the more densely inhabited countries.  (Hayek, 1935: 34) 
This is clearly a matter of degree.  The system can be imagined, and such a system might or might 
Ŷot, pƌoďaďlǇ Ŷot iŶ HaǇek͛s aŶd Mises͛s ǀieǁ, fiŶd it possiďle to sustaiŶ its eǆistiŶg huŵaŶ 
population.  Despite Mises͛s ŵoƌe eǆtƌeŵe stateŵeŶts this appears to be the most sensible reading 
of his contribution.  We will therefore exclusively address the impossibility argument in this sense.   
3 The Austrian case: private property as precondition for economic calculation  
So we turn to the Austrian case for the essential rôle of private property for economic calculation.  
Boettke sets this out very clearly: 
IŶ Mises͛ ǁƌitiŶgs theƌe aƌe fouƌ ďasiĐ ǁaƌŶiŶgs agaiŶst soĐialisŵ – the most decisive, of 
course, was the problem of the impossibility of rational economic calculation … IŶ a 
fundamental sense, all of these arguments are derivative of an argument for private 
property.  Without private property, there can be no advanced economic process.  (Boettke, 
2001: 33) 
Mises͛s argument about private property is, according to Boettke, embedded within the following 
sequence of propositions:  
1 Without private property in the means of production, there will be no market for the 
means of production. 
2 Without a market for a means of production, there will be no monetary prices 
established for the means of production. 
3 Without monetary prices, reflecting the relative scarcity of capital goods, economic 
decision-makers will be unable to rationally calculate the alternative use of capital 
goods.  (Boettke, 2001: 31) 
We can certainly agree with Boettke that we cannot have economic calculation without monetary 
prices, which communicate to agents the relative scarcity of capital goods.  We can also agree that 
without markets it will be difficult to establish reliable monetary prices, though there is more to be 
said on that which we cannot follow up here.  But is it the case that without private property the 
means of production there can be no markets for those capital goods?  Let͛s tƌǇ to suŵŵaƌise the 
argument.   
When an individual makes a transaction they receive information impounded in the price they face, 
and transmit information which is used in updating the price.  The potential purchaser compares the 
utility he believes he will obtain from consuming the good with the utility he might gain in the next 
best alternative use of the fraction of his wealth represented by the price.  We may infer that, if the 
individual behaves rationally, he will purchase additional units of the good until the marginal 
benefits he obtains equals the marginal opportunity cost to himself of doing so, and then stop.  The 
price has acted as a medium in which is expressed the value to the consumer of the utility that he 
might gain from consuming this or other alternative goods.  It allows comparability between 
qualitatively incommensurable use-values.  But it has done more than this.  The purchaser has 
communicated to the market the value to himself of the marginal unit of the good, in terms of the 
opportunity cost he is prepared to incur in order to obtain it, denominated in money units.  The 
same story applies on the supply side.  Calculation, that is the comparison of the estimated cost and 
the forecast benefit of marginal units, ensures that each agent gains an optimal bundle of goods, 
and that an optimal bundle of goods is produced for society as a whole.  The story is a familiar one to 
economists.  Without the discipline of monetary prices, we would have no guide to the appropriate 
allocations of effort and resources.  The Austrian standpoint is not to say that this optimal position is 
normally or even ever attained, but that the existence of prices underpins a continual error 
correction mechanism, such that agents are learning from their past experiences where they should 
expand and contract activities, continually adjusting prices and quantities in the direction of 
increasing efficiency.   
 What has been said so far applies to any economic agent, but a special place is accorded to the 
entrepreneur in the Austrian vision.  The entrepreneur carries out the functions mentioned above, 
ďut iŶ ƌelatioŶ Ŷot to ͚fiƌst oƌdeƌ͛ oƌ ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ goods, ďut to those of a ͚higheƌ oƌdeƌ͛ oƌ 
production goods, capital goods.  This has a number of consequences.  In estimating the benefits of 
an investment, the entrepreneur compares, not the satisfactions expected from the consumption of 
this and the next best alternative good, but the profit available from producing this and the next 
best alternative good.  So he is considering not his own satisfactions, but the satisfactions he expects 
others to obtain from the consumption of the good which his investment will make possible.  The 
ĐoŶsuŵeƌ͛s puƌĐhases aƌe speĐulatiǀe, siŶĐe he does Ŷot kŶoǁ ǁhat utilitǇ he ǁill deƌiǀe uŶtil he 
ĐoŶsuŵes it, ǁheŶ it͛s too late to ĐhaŶge his ŵiŶd.  The eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌ͛s deĐisioŶs aƌe douďlǇ 
speculative since he is speculating on what the consumer will speculate on.  To appraise the benefits 
of the investment he has to impute or ascribe benefits to the future, hoped-for consumers.   
The lure of profits and the threat of losses thus drives entrepreneurs to exert themselves to invest in 
capital goods that will best serve the consumers at the point where the new goods, produced with 
the aid of these capital goods, come onto the market.  The accumulation of losses will drive out of 
the market those who are relatively weak at this and accumulated profits will reward and encourage 
those who are good at it.  The market for capital goods is thus of critical importance as it allows the 
level and composition of investment to approach what consumers want, given their rate of time 
preference and the difficulty of producing output.   
So far so good.  But the Austrians now argue, or rather in general assert, that under socialism, since 
there will be no private property in the means of production, there will be no capital market, and 
hence no monetary prices for capital goods.  The title of Boettke͛s ďook, Calculation and 
Coordination,  
is also meant to convey the connection between these two key concepts – advanced 
complex coordination requires that economic actors are able to utilize the tools of economic 
calculation provided by private property, market prices and profit and loss accounting.  
(Boettke, 2001: 4) 
Acting people must mentally process the alternatives placed before them, and to do so they 
ŵust haǀe soŵe ͞aid to the huŵaŶ ŵiŶd͟ foƌ ĐoŵpaƌiŶg iŶputs aŶd output. Mises͛ gƌeat 
contribution to economic science was to establish that this decision-making ability is 
dependent on the institutional context of private property … In short, without private 
property in the means of production, rational economic calculation is not possible.  (Boettke, 
2001: 31) 
The key issue for Hayek, as it was for Mises, is that absent private property in the means of 
production rational economic calculation will be impossible.  (Boettke, 2001: 36) 
There is a footnote to Boettke͛s reference to Mises (Boettke, 2001: 289 n4), but it seems to refer us 
only to an assertion by Mises that this is the case, not an argument.  Another footnote (290 n6) 
refers us to Mises (1922: 99) for three advantages of private property.  I was unable to find any 
account of the alleged three-fold advantages of private property on p 99 or elsewhere in this work.  I 
haǀe seaƌĐhed thƌough Mises͛s ǁoƌks ͞EĐoŶoŵiĐ ĐalĐulatioŶ iŶ the soĐialist ĐoŵŵoŶǁealth͟ and 
Socialism. An Economic and Sociological Analysis (Mises, 1935; 1951) without finding an argument 
for the critical rôle of private property in the overall case against socialism.   
Boettke sets out his own understanding of the case as follows:   
The most important component of their [sĐ Mises͛s aŶd HaǇek͛s] argument was the 
functional significance they placed on the institution of private property and the rule of law.  
Property rights protected by the rule of law provide: 
1     legal certainty, which encourages investment; 
2     a motivation for responsible decision-making on behalf of owners;  
3     the background for social experimentation, which spurs progress; and 
4     the basis for economic calculation by expanding the context within which price, and  
 profit and loss, signals can reasonably guide resource use.  (Boettke, 2001: 197-198) 
Firstly, we may note that this entirely about private property – private property is by definition a 
property right protected by the rule of law.  So how do the properties of private property, according 
to Boettke, constitute the essential underpinning for economic calculation.  Point 1: it is of course 
true that legal certainty is required for calculation and investment.  So property rights are essential.  
But must those rights constitute private property?  There is nothing here to say that public property 
will not do the job.  Point 2: again, it is certainly the case that rational economic calculation requires 
responsible decision-making both on the part of, and on behalf of, owners.  But where is the 
argument that public property will lead to irresponsible decision-making on the part of or on behalf 
of the population.  We entrust the latter to choose their government, after all, and, for all its faults, 
democracy remains ͚the worst form of government, except for all the others͛.  Point 3: again, if the 
assertion is that public property cannot provide a background for experimentation, then the case 
needs to be made.  Point 4: the implicit claim seems to be that public property is incapable of 
providing a context for signals to guide resource use.  But that is to say that economic calculation is 
iŵpossiďle ǁithout pƌiǀate pƌopeƌtǇ, ǁhiĐh is to ďeg the ƋuestioŶ: that͛s ǁhat ǁe aƌe tƌǇiŶg to 
establish.   
4 Private versus several property, and ownership versus control 
Having looked for an argument for the necessity of private property for economic calculation in 
these core documents of the socialist calculation debate, and failed to find one, we turn to an 
alternative, and indeed one endorsed by Hayek: several property, oƌ ͚separate ownership͛.  HaǇek͛s 
last book, The Fatal Conceit, systematically uses the term several property instead of private 
property:  
an order serving a multiplicity of private purposes could in fact have been formed only on 
the basis of what I prefer to call several property, which is H. S. Maine's more precise term 
for what is usually described as private property.  (Hayek, 1988: 29-30)   
[W]e have tried to disentangle some of the confusions caused by the ambiguity of terms … 
and as the reader will have noticed, I generally prefer the less usual but more precise term 
`several property' to the more common expression `private property'.  (Hayek, 1988: 110) 
Hayek is tantalising here: despite using the term several on dozens of occasions, and indeed pointing 
out that that is what he is doing, he says nothing about why the term is preferable, how it can be 
ĐoŶsideƌed ͚ŵoƌe pƌeĐise͛.  Barnett  comments that  
several property – a term favoured by Friedrich Hayek – may be more apt [than private 
property].  The term ͞several property͟ makes it clearer that jurisdiction to use resources is 
dispersed among the ͞several͟ – meaning ͞diverse, many, numerous, distinct, particular, or 
sepaƌate͟ peƌsoŶs aŶd assoĐiatioŶs that Đoŵprise a society.  (Barnett, 2014: 65, quoting the 
Oxford English Dictionary.)   
The right of several property suggests that the control of resources should reflect the 
dispersal of personal and local knowledge.  (Barnett, 2014: 68) 
Interestingly, in an Afterword to the second edition of his book, Barnett reveals that he has changed 
his ŵiŶd aďout this: ͞Weƌe I ǁƌitiŶg this ďook todaǇ, hoǁeǀeƌ, I ŵight ĐhaŶge oŶe teƌŵ.  I ŵight use 
the teƌŵ ͚pƌiǀate pƌopeƌtǇ͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ the teƌŵ ͚seǀeƌal pƌopeƌtǇ͛ that I ďoƌrowed from HaǇek͟ 
(Barnett, 2014: 330).  So, essentially, several property is divided property, as opposed to the unitary 
property of an all-encompassing central authority – but, and this is why Barnett ultimately decides 
against its use – there is no particular requirement for it to be private, or non-governmental, rather 
than public, divided property.  And this is the point.  For if we can have such a thing as several 
property which is also in some sense public or social property, then all the arguments about the 
practicality of economic calculation go through, and the private property argument for the 
impossibility of socialism fails.   
The question is thus, can we envisage a form of several property which is not private property?  To 
help us here we need to draw on the distinction between property or ownership, on the one hand, 
and control, on the other.  Barnett indeed points in this direction when he points out that several 
property suggests dispersed control.  Who actually makes the decisions on behalf of the large 
corporations, government departments, and non-profit institutions characteristic of capitalistic 
economies today?  It is the directors, managers and administrators of those bodies, and not the 
owners, whether they be shareholders or voters or some other group.  Boettke alludes to this 
separation of ownership and control when he claims that  
In economics, ownership rights refer to the locus of effective decision-making about the use 
of resources (i.e. de facto ownership), and may or may not be consistent with legal 
boundaries of property (de jure ownership).  This insight is today a standard convention 
among economists.  (Boettke, 2001: 177) 
But this is not quite right.  It is perfectly possible to conceive of a separation such as he describes, 
between de facto and de jure ownership, and no doubt it was as endemic in the Soviet Union, as he 
claims.  But this is not the same as the ownership-control dichotomy, which is indeed about the 
locus of effective decision-making about the use of resources.  Boettke here conflates two close but 
distinct polarities.  The difference is this: in a system with an ownership-control division, the 
managers make the decisions and there is a principal-agent problem: those decisions are not optimal 
for the owners, but give undue weight to the managers.  When the latter have driven this to the 
point that they have de facto ownership, then the de jure owners have been or are in process of 
being expropriated, and it only remains to re-write the property rights to match the new reality: the 
servant has become the master.  But this by no means implies that those who employ servants will 
necessarily end up enslaved by them.  Strangely, for an Austrian writer, Boettke conflates an end 
state with the process which might under certain circumstances lead to it.  He is not alone.  Lavoie 
(1981: 42) ascribes putative misunderstanding of the socialist calculation debate by ͞ŶeoĐlassiĐal 
historians of economic thought͟ to theiƌ failuƌe to ƌealise that ͞oǁŶeƌship͟ ƌeallǇ ŵeaŶs ͞de facto 
ĐoŶtƌol, oǀeƌ ƌesouƌĐes͟.   
Let͛s see hoǁ Mises aŶd HaǇek addƌess this issue.  Mises͛s disĐussioŶ, iŶ Socialism. An Economic and 
Sociological Analysis, oĐĐuƌs iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of a disĐussioŶ of ͞aƌtifiĐial͟ ŵaƌkets as a solutioŶ to the 
problem of economic calculation:  
The advocates of the artificial market, however, are of the opinion that an artificial market 
can be created by instructing the controllers of the different industrial units to act as if they 
were entrepreneurs in a capitalistic state.  They argue that even under Capitalism the 
managers of joint stock companies work not for themselves but for the companies, that is to 
say, for the shareholders.  Under Socialism, therefore, it would be possible for them to act in 
exactly the same way as before, with the same circumspection and devotion to duty.  
(Mises, 1922: 138).   
HaǇek agƌees ǁith Mises͛s pƌeseŶtatioŶ of the ƋuestioŶ:  
The question, then, is not whether all problems of production and distribution can be 
rationally decided by one central authority but whether decisions and responsibility can be 
successfully left to competing individuals who are not owners or are otherwise directly 
interested in the means of production under their charge. Is there any decisive reason why 
the responsibility for the use made of any part of the existing productive equipment should 
always be coupled with a personal interest in the profits or losses realized on them, or would 
it really be only a question whether the individual managers, who deputize for the 
community in the exercise of its property rights under the scheme in question, served the 
common ends loyally and to the best of their capacity?  (Hayek, 1935: 219-220) 
So what answer do they give to this question?  Mises͛s aŶsǁeƌ seems to start with an argument that 
there is a difference between state-appointed and stock-holder appointed managers (Mises, 1922: 
138).  The shareholders are risking their own property.  This will sometimes work and be profitable, 
and sometimes not.  The line of thought seems to be that the market will select for enrichment 
those shaƌeholdeƌs ǁho ŵake good ĐhoiĐes aŶd ǀiĐe ǀeƌsa foƌ the ƌest.  But ǁe doŶ͛t kŶoǁ, ďeĐause 
the argument immediately peters and switches to a discussion of static and dynamic conceptions 
(Mises, 1922: 139).  The connection of this with the topic supposedly under discussion remains 
opaque: presumably it is preparatory for the next topic, about the necessity of a capital market to 
ensure a rational allocation of resources to the production of capital goods.  However, we are left in 
the dark as to the essential difference that the hiring problem introduces between public and private 
enterprises.   
Mises͛s discussion of static and dynamic approaches leads into a rather fragmentary discussion of 
capital markets.  This ƌeǀolǀes aƌouŶd a ŶotioŶ of ͞speĐulatiǀe Đapitalists͟ – those who decide 
whether capital should be withdrawn from one sphere of production and transferred to another.  
͞This is not a matter for the managers of joint stock companies,͟ Mises Đlaiŵs, ͞it is essentially a 
matter for the capitalists … who buy and sell stocks and shares, who make loans and recover them, 
who make deposits in the banks and draw them out of the banks again, who speculate in all kinds of 
Đoŵŵodities͟ (Mises, 1922: 139).  Now, despite Mises͛s Đlaiŵ, these fuŶĐtioŶs aƌe geŶeƌallǇ Đaƌƌied 
out by the staff of banks and large financial corporations.  So, again, the question is, whether they 
can be employed by state institutions as they are now by private-sector ones.  Again, the argument 
that this cannot work peters out inconclusively.   
Mises justifies his assumption that capital markets cannot be run on a socialist basis thus:  
It is scarcely to be assumed that socialists of whatever persuasion would seriously propose 
that this fuŶĐtioŶ should ďe ŵade oǀeƌ to soŵe gƌoup of people ǁho ǁould ͚siŵplǇ͛ haǀe 
the business of doing what capitalists and speculators do under capitalistic conditions, the 
only difference being that the product of their foresight should not belong to them but to 
the community.  Proposals of this sort may well be made concerning the managers of joint 
stock companies.  They can never be extended to capitalists and speculators, for no socialist 
would dispute that the function which capitalists and speculators perform under Capitalism, 
namely directing the use of capital goods into that direction in which they best serve the 
demands of the consumer, is only performed because they are under the incentive to 
preserve their property and to make profits which increase it or at least allow them to live 
without diminishing their capital.  (Mises, 1922: 141) 
A Ŷuŵďeƌ of ĐoŵŵeŶts aƌe iŶ oƌdeƌ heƌe.  FiƌstlǇ, it is Ŷot foƌ Mises to deĐide oŶ soĐialists͛ ďehalf 
what the latter may or may not ͚seƌiouslǇ pƌopose͛ or dispute.  Either these activities are indeed 
functions, and then they must be fulfilled under socialism as much as under capitalism, or they are 
not, and the functionless, parasitic excrescences of financial capital can be allowed to wither away.  
The second point is that, of course, the owners of the capital in question, the population as a whole, 
acting through their democratic political processes, will be face exactly the incentive that Mises 
mentions, to preserve and augment their property, and to balance that goal with living well.  And so 
they will have every incentive to select and invigilate administrators who will serve these interests – 
just as today the owners of capital do.   
The conclusion to be drawn from a consideration of Mises͛s disĐussioŶ of this poiŶt, therefore, is 
that although, of course, one can think of very serious principal-agent problems which socialist firms 
and socialist banks would face in employing and managing its managers and administrators, Mises 
has not made any case that these problems would be worse than those faced by capitalist firms and 
banks, let alone so much worse as to render socialism impossible.   
Turning to Hayek, again, tantalisingly, he slips away from the topic under discussion to talk about 
something else – in this case the appropriate treatment of monopolies (Hayek, 1935: 220).  Though 
the management of monopolies is an important question both for capitalist and socialist economics, 
what this has to do with the topic – namely the possibility of a socialist system hiring managers for 
the various industrial, financial and commercial undertakings to carry out rational economic 
calculation – is undisclosed.   
Eventually Hayek does return to the question: ͞At fiƌst sight͟, he ĐoŶĐedes, ͞it is not evident why 
such a socialist system with competition within industries as well as between them should not work 
as ǁell oƌ as ďadlǇ as Đoŵpetitiǀe Đapitalisŵ͟ ;HaǇek, ϭϵϯϱ: ϮϯϮͿ.  ͞The ĐƌuĐial ƋuestioŶs iŶ this Đase 
are, What is to be the independent business unit?  Who is to be the manager?  What resources are 
to be entrusted to him and how his [siĐ]suĐĐess oƌ failuƌe is to ďe tested?͟   
It is not possible to conceive of th[e] central authority simply as a kind of super-bank which 
lends the available funds to the highest bidder.  It would lend to persons who have no 
property of their own.  It would therefore bear all the risk and would have not claim for a 
definite amount of money as a bank has.  (Hayek, 1935: 232-233)   
But this is completely wrong.  The publicly-owned bank is not lending to the managers of the firm in 
their personal capacity but in their capacity as representatives of the firm: the contract is with the 
firm.  There must be an expectation of future revenues and a calculation of risk-weighted 
expectations of profit and loss, and a legal claim on the assets of that firm, if lending is not to 
become simply gift.   
HaǇek͛s Ŷeǆt poiŶt is to make the perfectly sensible point that with the passage of time, there will be 
changes in circumstances ƌeƋuiƌiŶg ĐhaŶges iŶ eĐoŶoŵiĐ oƌgaŶisatioŶ.  ͞OŶ ǁhat pƌiŶĐiples ǁill it [sĐ 
ĐeŶtƌal authoƌitǇ] aĐt?͟ (Hayek, 1935: 233).   
The decision to whom to entrust a given amount of resources will have to be made on the 
basis of individual promises of future return.  Or, rather, it will have to be made on the 
statement that a certain return is to be expected with a certain degree of probability.  There 
will, of course, be no objective test of the magnitude of the risk.  But who is to decide 
whether the risk is worth taking?  The central authority will have no other grounds on which 
to decide but the past performance of the entrepreneur.  (Hayek, 1935: 234).   
Here Hayek has clearly forgotten what he was supposed to be talking about, namely the 
͞Đoŵpetitiǀe solutioŶ͟ to the calculation problem, that is, the situation where socially owned means 
of production are run as several property by managers employed as agents of the public sector.  In 
this conception of socialism, it is the managers of the bank and the managers of the firm, acting as 
representatives of their businesses, who will make these decisions on the basis of price signals, and 
thereby contribute to the continual renewal of those prices and their adaptation to new 
circumstances.  The decisions that Hayek mentions will be made on the basis of prices.  Hayek now 
passes on to various questions, all of which flow from this mischaracterisation of the case he is 
supposed to be examining and we cannot follow him into their intricacies.   
So, again, we find that there is no Austrian argument for the essential rôle of private property in 
economic calculation, and hence the impossibility of socialism.  It is of course the case that 
alternative arguments have been sought and proposed.  One is the information argument, 
introduced by Hayek, and summarised thus by Boettke:  
The importance of this emphasis on private property should not be underestimated.  
Without private property the very exchange process which generates the informational 
inputs into the decision process would not be produced. All the data that are given in many 
of the models that we will discuss shortly would not exist. In other words, it is not that in the 
absence of private property in the means of production it is more difficult to access 
economic knowledge; rather, the knowledge is not available to anyone (centralized, 
decentralized, or computer planners) because it will not come into existence.  (Boettke, 
2001: 290 n8) 
The problem, again, is that this begs the question.  It is assumed that ͞Without private property the 
… exchange process … would not be produced͟.  Well, ǁhǇ Ŷot?  WhǇ ǁould the eǆĐhaŶge pƌoĐess 
between the severally-controlled but publicly-owned socialist enterprises not generate and 
communicate the information, the data, that agents require in order to carry out economic 
calculation?  Much has been written by Hayek and his followers on the question of the rôle of 
information in economics, much of it extremely rich and enlightening.  But what it does not do is to 
answer the question as to the necessity of private property for a functioning economy.   
5 Is there anything left?   
At this point I think it is necessary to anticipate and address an Austrian objection, which will surely 
be raised, to what I have said.  Namely, the system described so emulates the capitalist system that 
there is nothing left of socialism in it.  Marx famously called the joint-stoĐk ĐoŵpaŶǇ ͞the aďolitioŶ 
of the Đapitalist ŵode of pƌoduĐtioŶ ǁithiŶ the Đapitalist ŵode of pƌoduĐtioŶ͟ ;Maƌǆ, 1959: 438).  It 
might be claimed that the consistent market socialism outlined above constitutes the abolition of 
the socialist mode of production within the socialist mode of production.  This I false.  It is important 
to underline that what I say here is not to be understood as advocacy.  I am not advocating here a 
socialism such as I describe, but addressing the focus of this paper – the question as to whether 
socialism of any kind is possible.  So the contention is, that indeed it is possible, for the state to own 
all the means of production, and the managers to be charged with operating individual enterprises 
on a profit-maximising basis, under the guidance of prices taken to be parametric (Lange, 1938: 70), 
and for rational economic calculation to take place.   
The rôle of government here is to plan, that is, to decide what are the correct prices.  All the 
problems of capitalism can be reduced to the proposition that where individual agents are behaving 
in a manner which is sub-optimal from the perspective of society, this will be not because they are 
nasty, but because they are receiving incorrect signals and facing the wrong incentives, in the form 
of spontaneously emerging market prices.  (Almost) nobody thinks that the prices we face are right, 
that is, are what we require in order to align individual and social interests.  Nobody in a capitalist 
system has the task of adjusting the constellation of prices that we face, only of implementing their 
own interest, taking that constellation as given: the prices which emerge are an unintended 
consequence of that self-seeking activity, and there is no reason to believe that unintended 
consequences are necessarily benign.  Prices and the price system are external effects, that is, 
effects imposed on all and not themselves mediated by prices: nobody has bought or sold the prices 
at which we must trade; we cannot choose to select the prices we want by casting our dollar votes.  
Under a socialist system the selection of appropriate prices would presumably be a core public 
function.   
It is possible that the desired prices in every market would be achieved by the general imposition of 
a system of Pigovian taxes and subsidies.  What are the big issues?  Damage to the environment?  
Tax those activities that damage the environment to the extent of our best guess as to the present 
value of the damage done.  Poverty?  Deliver the poor a subsidy in the form of a basic income which 
does not damage the incentive to work.  Inequality?  Impose a steeply progressive income tax.  And 
so on.  Since the means of production are public property, all profits will flow into the public domain, 
where the population as a whole may decide how much to distribute as a social dividend or basic 
income, how much to retain for other desirable public projects, and how much to invest to augment 
the capital stock.  So far as I can see there is no Austrian argument for the impossibility of such a 
system.  Spontaneous prices aggregate all the continually changing information of time and place 
accessible to the market participants, and the central adjustment to those prices aggregates that 
information which is not accessible to the market participants as such, but accessible to the polity 
via the democratic process.  It might occur to you that what has been described would be difficult in 
the extreme to implement.  Of course.  Such a system would, I imagine, be characterised by 
bickering and snafus on a massive scale.  Just as capitalism is.  But that is not the same as saying that 
it is impossible.  Socialism, just supposing it were ever tried, may indeed turn out to be the worst 
possiďle ŵode of pƌoduĐtioŶ … eǆĐept foƌ all the otheƌs.   
This, I think, dispels the potential counter-argument that the system of public ownership of the 
means of production, coupled with the individual enterprise of a profession of managers and 
administrators, would lack any socialist content.  To repeat: nothing here is advocacy, merely 
exploration of possibilities, in order to put the Austrian claim of impossibility to the test.   Readers 
will be tempted to think of a million and one objections to what I have said, and no doubt many of 
those objections will have much force.  But those readers should focus on the key point addressed 
here: is a capitalist system based on private property essential for rational economic calculation, or 
is such calculation at least possible in a socialist system based on collective ownership and several 
control.   
6 Conclusion 
This paper has looked at a small sample of the literature on the socialist calculation debate and even 
there has focused exclusively on one question: the Austrian case for claiming that private property is 
a prerequisite for rational economic calculation, and that socialism is therefore impossible.  The 
paper has drawn the conclusion that the Austrians would be right, if they had said instead that 
rational economic calculation depended on several control.  Not private but several, and not 
property but control and management.  However, several control, it was argued, is compatible with 
socialism.  Hence the private-property argument for the impossibility of socialism fails.   
Depressingly, there is not much here which is new.  Although the details differ, similar points were 
made in the socialist contributions to the debate in the 1930s.  Although Lange postulates a slightly 
clumsier, clunkier system, with a smaller degree of subsidiarity than that outlined above, there is 
much in common.  Dealing with the contention of Hayek and Robbins that planners would have to 
solve vastly many equations – that is, excess demand equations in a Walrasian general equilibrium 
setting – Lange says  
EǆaĐtlǇ the saŵe kiŶd aŶd Ŷuŵďeƌ of ͚eƋuatioŶs͛, Ŷo less aŶd Ŷo ŵoƌe, haǀe to ďe ͚solǀed͛ iŶ 
a socialist as in a capitalist economy, and exactly the same persons, the consumers and 
ŵaŶageƌs of pƌoduĐtioŶ plaŶts, haǀe to ͚solǀe͛ theŵ … theƌe is Ŷot the slightest ƌeasoŶ ǁhǇ 
a trial and error procedure, similar to that in a competitive market, could not work in a 
socialist economy to determine the accounting prices of capital goods and of the productive 
resources in public ownership.  (Lange, 1938: 88-89)   
The point, annoyingly, is that Hayek is making the mistake he so rightly condemns in others: the 
conflation implicit with explicit knowledge, of knowing how with knowing that.  We economists can 
understand an agent as carrying out economic calculation of the most intricate kind when he 
chooses to invest, or not, in industrial plant, but the agent himself is ignorant that he is doing 
anything of the kind.  That the effect of what the socialist manger does is to solve many equations, 
just as in the case of a snooker player, this is not explicit knowledge which he would ever know how 
to articulate.   
Further papers will examine other aspects of the socialist calculation debate.   
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